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STATEMENT OF CASE
This action arose out of an alleged breach of contract. The
parties entered into a joint venture agreement to develop a subdivision
and share in the net profits derived from the venture.

Each party

sought an accounting and a dissolution of the joint venture.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before a jury on the issue of breach of
contract which returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of
Coombs.

Smith and The Squire, Inc. asked for a new trial, and a partial

new trial was granted.

The matter was then submitted to the Trial Court

for determination on the evidence submitted to the jury.

The Trial

Court found no cause of action and found that the joint venture contract
between the parties had been modified by a subsequent oral agreement.
The issue of an accounting and dissolution of the joint venture was
submitted solely to the Trial Court. The Trial Court found the terms
of the contract as it relates to distribution of net profits to mean
"net profits before taxes" and further that Coombs did not need to
account for the trade-in properties received from the sale of the lots
in the subdivision.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellants, Smith and The Squire, Inc. seek reversal of the
Trial Court1s Judgment as to no cause of action for two specific
alleged breaches by Coombs of the joint venture agreement and for
judgment in the amount of $7'+,255.M-6; a proper interpretation of the

clear and unambiguous language of the joint venture contract of "net
profit" to mean "net profits" and not "net profits before taxes"; and
requiring Coombs to account for $3,4-31.88 of trade-in value Coombs received on the sale of two lots in the subdivision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Vista International Corporation and Lynn H. Coombs entered into
an Agreement to develop certain land.

This agreement is Exhibit 2-P.

Coombs adjnitted he signed the contract and admitted that it was correct
in all of its terms (R. 311, 312). On January 12, 1973 Smith acquired
Vista1s position in the agreement (R. 16).
The agreement (Exhibit 2-P) is an integrated instrument which
details the obligations as well as the benefits to the respective parties.
Smith, for purposes of appeal, complained that Coombs breached the contract in the following particulars:
A.

Coombs breached his obligations to develop the subdivision
within the cost breakdown contained in the contract.

B.

Coombs failed to sell seven lots per month and therefore
should pay the interest on the development loan (R. 287).

CoombsT defense to the asserted breaches consisted of:
A.

General denial.

B.

Cost overruns resulted from the lack of timely financing.

C.

Coombs was relieved of the obligations to sell seven lots
per month by subsequent oral agreement (R. 282, 283).

-2-

The Agreement specifically required Coombs to be responsible
for the development of a subdivision, the cost of which was not to exceed $141,665.00 (Ex. 2-P). The development costs exceeded that figure
by $40,770.00 (R. 287, 480 and Ex. 34-P).

The agreement required Coombs

to sell seven (7) lots per month or in the event Coombs failed to do so,
Coombs agreed to pay the monthly interest on the development loans for
each month he failed to sell seven lots (Ex. 2-P). It is conceded by
Coombs that he never sold seven lots in any month (R0 320). It is undisputed that the interest on the development loan during the period
was $33,485.46 (Ex. 35-P).
Coombs organized a company known as The Squire, Inc. through
which the parties were to effectuate the joint venture (R. 411). Vista
was to obtain development financing of up to $150,000.00.

Coombs was

to receive payment of $37,500.00 for the raw land, and to be fully
responsible for the development of the subdivision by putting in the
offsite improvements of roads, sewer, curb and gutter and utilities.
Coombs further was responsible for the selling of the lots (R. 313).
The parties agreed to share the benefits of the joint venture on a
40% basis to Coombs and 60% basis to Smith (formerly Vista) of the
"net profit from the sale of lots" (Ex0 2-P).
Smith asserts that "net profits" means after taxes, while Coombs
asserts this language means "net profits before taxes". Elmer Fox and
Company accounting, (a copy of which is in the Exhibit folder), made an
allocation of the distribution after taxes and further discloses that
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the sum of $27,4-12.00 in taxes had been paid by The Squire, Inc. durirg
1969 through 1973 (R. 30). The trial courtTs judgment reflects a distribution of "net profits before taxes" (R. 11, 12 and 20).
Both parties sought an accounting and a dissolution of the joint
venture (R. 280, 288, 289). In the accounting rendered by the respective
parties, each asserts error on appeal (R. M-, 7 and 8).

Smith asserts

that Coombs has not properly accounted for the following items:
A0

The trade-in on Lot No. 25 sold to Doyle

B.

$1,600.00 for the trade-in on the Slayton lot.

Coombs asserts the trial court erred in not allowing Coombs to keep the
rents Coombs collected (R. M-, 7 and 8).
ARGUMENT
I
COOMBS BREACHED THE JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT BY EXCEEDING THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AND FAILING TO SELL
SEVEN LOTS PER MONTH.
Coombs, by the terms of Exhibit 2-P, "shall be fully responsible
for the development of the subdivision, including . . .the cost of said
off-site improvements not to exceed. . .$14-1,665.00." It is undisputed
that the development costs exceeded the schedule by $4-0,770.00 (see
Exhibit 34-P).
The Trial Court found that the cost overrun did exist but concluded that Vista had "waived any right to recover by increasing the
lots sales prices. . .and modified Exhibit 2-P". (R. 19). This conclusion of law is "naked" inasmuch as waiver and/or modification is an
-M-

affirmative defense, see Rule 8(c) URCP, which is conspicuous by its
very absence from Defendants pleadings. Not only is this defense
deemed waived under Rule 12 (h) URCP but the evidence adduced at trial
does not support such a conclusion.
It is recognized that a written contract can be modified or
substituted, even by a subsequent oral agreement, as is stated in
Southern Acid & Sulphur Co. vQ Childs, 207 Ark. 1109, 18M- SW2d 586
(19M-5) at page 588:
"We are mindful of the principle that a written
contract may be modified or substituted by a subsequent oral agreement, but the burden is upon
the party asserting the subsequent modification
to show the assent of the other party thereto.TT
(citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
The very recent case of PLC Landscape Const, v. Piccadilly Fish T N Chips,
Inc., 28 Ut 2d 350, 502 P2d 562 (1972) at page 563 acknowledges the
foregoing proposition while requiring mutual consent:
TT
0

. .any such change, modification, extension
or addition to their arrangement for doing business with each other that they may mutually
agree." (citations omitted)
The general law is well stated in 17 AmJur 2d Contracts §M-65
pages 93*4- and 935 which states:
"Undoubtedly, a contract may be modified with the
assent of both parties, provided the modification
does not violate the law or public policy, and
provided that there is consideration for the new
agreement. . . 0The mental purpose of one of the
parties to a contract cannot change its terms,
nor are indefinite expressions sufficient to
establish a binding agreement to change the formal requirements of a written contract. A request, suggestion or proposal of alteration or
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modification, made after an unconditional acceptance
of an offer, and not assented to by the opposite
party, does not affect the contract then in force
and effect by reason of the acceptance0 One receiving an offer to change a contract to which he is a
party is held to be under no obligation to answer
it; and his silence cannot be construed as an acceptance where nothing else is shown. Mere negotiations
between the parties will not suffice to produce a
modification. Before that result can be accomplished,
the negotiations must ripen into a mutual, valid and
enforceable agreement to modify the old contract0TT
(emphasis supplied)
This view is particularly applicable in this instance and is supported
by Utah law in Schofield v. ZionTs Co-op Mercantile Institution, 85 Ut
281, 39 P2d 34-2, 3M-5 (1934) wherein this court stated:
"When the plaintiffs had completely performed their
obligations0 0 .the contract was complete and binding, and not subject to modification by the company
without consent of plaintiffsQTT (emphasis supplied)
Coombs asserts the alleged modification came about in conversations with Mr. Prestwich. Mr. CoombsT testimony is in direct conflict
with that of Mr. PrestwichTs0
ious at

Mr. CoombsT testimony is very dub-

best and it is submitted that Coombs constantly altered his

testimony to fit the occasion.

For example, about the cost over-runs

with which he had sole responsibility Coombs testified:
T?

Q. (by Mr0 Brown) 0 Now, Mr. Coombs, do you know
the cost of the actual development of those lots
with the streets and the gutter and the curb, and
the sewer and everything?
A. No.
Q. You donTt know those costs?
A0

No.

(R. 312, 313)"

Later, after 2 days of trial and a number of recesses, Coombs testified:
a

TT

Qo (by Mr. Gordon). Now, in your capacity as
supervisor of the development, did you have contact with any of the persons who were to do the
work on the subdivision to develop it?
A. I got the contractor's bid forms. . .and requested bids from them.
Q. What did you do with them?
A 0 After we collected the bids at the bid opening,
we went through them — most of the contractor's
were there at the opening. I took the bids to Mr.
Prestwich, he and I went over the bids, added up
figures to see if these were reasonable, and selected the bid to take on the subdivision." (R.379)
Again under Mr. Gordon, Coombs testified:
TT

Q0

Are you aware of that (the cost over-runs)?

Ao Yes.
Q. Did you discuss those cost over-runs with any
one from The Squire, Inc.?
Ao

Many times#TT

It was at this point that Mr. Coombs conveniently remembered the alleged
modification (R. M-30).
"And we discussed it for quite a while. I suggested that we'll have to do — the only way
we'll have to cover this is to raise the price
of the lots. And as we discussed that I suggested
that we raise the price of the lots to cover the
amount of the over-runs at the time, and he accepted that situation. We established terms on
what the lots would be selling for, the price,
the minimum terms and was authorized to sell
them on that basis from then on0
Q. Did you proceed to selling the lots then for
that increased cost?
Ao Yes. We did that several times0 We increased
the price several times to cover these costs0TT
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CoombsT remarkable memory will become even more apparent in subsequent points.
The testimony is clear and concise on the part of Vista that no
such modification had ever been agreed to. Mr. Prestwich, President of
The Squire, Inc. during the critical time, testified at page M-52 of the
record, that one change from $35,000.00 to $37,500.00 for payment to
Coombs on the raw land had been made:
TT

Q.

But no other term had ever been altered?

A.

To my recollection, no.

Q.

Did you ever authorize any other changes?

N.

No. Never0TT

The law is well settled that both parties must agree with all
of the formalities of a new contract to effectuate a modification. As
the court stated in Keco Industries, Inc. v. ACF Industries, Incorporated,
(M-CCA-1963) , 316 F2d 513, 516:
tT
0

. .mutual assent is as much a requisite element
in effecting a contractual modification as it is
in the initial creation of a contract.TT (citations
omitted)
Further 1 Corbin on Contracts, §72 p 306 states:
"If a party to an existing contract proposes a
modification thereof, the mere silence of the
other party leaves the contract as before without modification."
The contract had been fully performed by Vista at the time of
the alleged modification. At 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts §4-61, page 929 it
states:

-8-

"Where a contract has been fully performed by one
party, the consent of the other party is insufficient consideration for an agreement discharging,
modifying or replacing the original contract; in
such case, some other consideration is necessary
TT

• • •

Again at 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts §4-69, page 939:
TT
0

. .most courts support the general principle
that a modification can be nothing but a new
contract and must be supported by a consideration like every other contract."

In the case of H & W Paving Co. v. Asphalt Paving Company, 147
Colo 506, 364- P2d 185, (1961), the general law has been expressed as
follows:
"Numerous authorities might be cited in support
of the proposition that in order to avoid the
duties imposed by the terms of a written contract through a subsequent parol agreement, the
latter must be supported by an adequate consideration moving to the party who would otherwise
be entitled to enforce the written agreement. 0 ."
In the very recent case of Rosellini v. Banchero, 83 Wash 2d 268, 517
P2d 955, 958 (1974) the Washington court concluded:
". o .a modification or subsequent agreement is
not supported by consideration if one party is
to perform some additional obligation while the
other party is simply to perform that which he
promised in the original contract...We hold
that under such circumstances the second agreement must be supported by consideration."
The foregoing argument is applicable to the alleged waiver
and/or modification as it relates to the interest provisions for CoombsT
failure to sell seven lots per month. The only testimony even asserting
an alleged waiver and/or modification of the provisions requiring Coombs
to sell seven lots per month or pay the interest obligations is contained
In p^ges 4-31 through 433 of the record. Even a casual examination of

this testimony by Mr. Coombs reflects not an agreement to modify, nor
a waiver, but merely a request to have Coombs sell some contracts.
Giving Coombs the best possible view of the evidence it discloses:
"He (Mr. Prestwich) asked me to emphasize my
efforts now instead on the lot sales on to the
contract sales0 . 0TT (R. 432, 433)
Does this constitute a waiver or modification?

Emphatically, No.

But when specifically asked if this modified the interest provisions Mr.
Prestwich in answer to Mr. Gordon1s question stated:
"Q. Now, isn't it time that you and Mr. Coombs
discussed the fact that he should divert his
efforts toward selling these contracts rather
than selling the lots in order to raise additional capital so the project could continue?
A. Oh, I donTt believe I ever told him to
stop selling lots. That was a critical issue.
Q. ThatTs true, but thatTs not what I askedQ
To divert his interest from selling the lots to
concentrate his efforts on selling the contract
rather than the lots?
A 0 I think I could have asked him, yes, to
sell some contracts." (emphasis supplied
R. 4-72)
On direct examination of Mr. Prestwich in response to the following question
TT

Q. (by Mr 0 Brown) Mr. Prestwich, ever had any
discussion with Mr. Coombs as it relates to the
selling of seven lots per month?

A. At one point Mr. Coombs said he was having a
hard time selling seven lots per month and didn't
see how he could do it0 I told him I couldnTt
see how the contract could be changed. 0 0 I
never authorized him to sell less than seven0
He said why, I can't sell seven. I said you
better sell everything you can0 The contract
says seven lots per month or else to pay the
interest, . ." (R0 451)
-10-

Smith testified emphatically that no waiver or modification
was ever granted. At page 5M-2 of the record Smith testified:
"By Mr. Brown. Q. Mr. Smith, during the term
in which either in your capacity with Vista
International or from May T 72, through and inclusive of the time you have owned in your individual capacity, have you ever authorized any
forgiveness of any of the conditions contained
in Exhibit 2-P which is the joint venture agreement?
A0

I have not."

The corporate minutes of Vista, dated February 18, 1973, long
after any alleged modification and/or waiver supposedly took place discloses that no waiver or modification was given. The Board of Directors
of Vista declared:
". . .no authorization had been given at any time
by the Board of Directors to any officer to forgive interest under this joint venture agreement
and that the Board of Directors has had no knowledge of such action and that the Board of Directors hereby makes record, for and on behalf of
the corporation, that any interest due by Lynn
Coombs to Vista International Corporation under
the terms and conditions of the joint venture
contract shall be deemed fully due and owing to
Vista International Corporation." (Exhibit 5-P)
The only evidence of the alleged modification as it relates to
the forgiveness of selling seven lots spring from the mouth of Coombs.
Coombs conveniently remembers that Mr. Prestwich:
TT
0

. .asked me to sell the contracts."

(R. M-32)

This cannot possibly show a modification or waiver.

There is

no mutual consent nor is there any consideration, nor is there an offer
on the part of Coombs or an acceptance on the part of Vista.

No, this

constitutes a self-serving statement that cannot overcome the clear
11

uncontroverted evidence on the part of Vista, Prestwich and Smith that
the terms were never changed or varied0

Finally Coombs admitted:

TT

Qo . . oMr. Coombs, I show you what has been marked
as Exhibit 2-P and ask if you are familiar with that
particular document?
A. Yes.
Q.

Did you sign that document, sir?

A. Yes.
Q0

Would you briefly tell the Court what that document is?

A 0 ItTs a joint venture agreement between Vista International and myself to subdivide approximately twenty
acres of land in West Jordan.
. . 0 Q. And is this agreement correct is all its terms. . .?
A. It appears to be."
(R. 311, 312)
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING
THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF
THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT.

Each party sought an accounting and a termination of the joint
venture. The provision for the sharing of the profit is clear, concise
and unambiguous. Exhibit 2-P states:
"It is understood and agreed that the said Coombs
shall not be entitled to any compensation for said
efforts with the exception of receiving forty percent of the net profits from the sale of the lots
in said development." (emphasis supplied)
The Trial Court interpreted the emphasized language to mean "forty
percent of the net profits before taxes". The Trial Court added the
words "before taxes" to the plain, clear and unambiguous words the
parties themselves adopted0
In Ephriam Theater Company v. Hawk, 7 Ut 2d 163, 321 P2d 221,
223 (1958), this Court stated:

" 0 . .it is well to keep in mind the fundamental
concepts in regard to contracts: that their purpose is to reduce to writing the conditions upon
which the minds of the parties have met and to
fix their rights and duties in respect thereto.
The intent so expressed is to be found, if possible, within the four corners of the instrument itself in accordance with the ordinary
accepted meaning of the words used0 0 .It would
defeat the very purpose of formal contracts to
permit a party to invoke the use of words or
conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove
that the parties did not mean what they said,
or to use such inconsistent words or conduct
to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity where
none would otherwise exist. Generally speaking,
neither of the parties, nor the court has any
right to ignore or modify conditions which are
clearly expressed merely because it may subject
one of the parties to hardship, but they must
be enforced in accordance with the intention
as * * * manifested by the language used by
the parties to the contract."
Further this Court expressed the weight given to the Trial CourtTs
interpretation by the following declaration:
"Unless uncertainty opens the door to extraneous
explanations, the trial court is in no position
of advantage in interpreting documents, and his
views thereon are not indulged any special credit
as are findings on issues of fact." (Ephriam,
supra) .
In the case of Needles v. Kansas City, Missouri, 371 SW2d 300,
304- (1963) , the Missouri Court stated:
"The fact that the parties do not now agree upon
the proper construction of their contract does
not make it ambiguous." (citations omitted)
The simple statement of the law found in McCallum v. Campbell-Simpson
Motor Co,, 82 Ida 160, 3M-9 P2d 986, 990 (1960) is most appropriate in
this instance. The Idaho Court stated:
-13-

"We must construe the contract according to the
plain language used by the parties. While a
court may interpret agreements voluntarily
entered into, a court cannot modify an agreement so as to create a new and different one,
nor is a court at liberty to revise an agreement where its interpretation is involved,,
Courts cannot make for the parties better
arrangements than they themselves have been
satisfied to make, and by a process of interpretation relieve one of the parties from the
terms which he voluntarily consented to; nor
can courts interpret an agreement to mean
something the contract does not itself contain0TT (citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)
The language used by the parties is of primary importance0

The

interest is generally deduced from the common ordinary meaning of the words
used0

In Jensenys Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Ut 2d 273, 323 P2d 258, 260, 261

(1958) this Court stated:
"But it is also elementary and of extreme
practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their clear and understandable language deliberately committed
to writing and endorsed by them as signatories thereto. . . It is not unreasonable
to hold one responsible for language which
he himself espouses. 0 . .The rule excluding
matters outside the four corners of a clear,
understandable document, is a fair one, and
oneTs contentions concerning his intent should
extend no further than his own clear expressions0TT
The Washington Court in Jack v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., Wash.,
205 P2d 351 (1949) stated:
n

We agree with counsel for appellant that, while
definitions of words contained in standard dictionaries are not controlling, they are generally
accepted as the common meaning of the word, ...

-14-

The common or normal meaning of language will
be given to the words employed, unless the
circumstances show that in a particular case,
a special meaning should be attached to it."
The Trial Court violated the elementary law of contract interpretation
as stated in 17 Amjur, Contracts §242, page 629:
"A court is not at libertyD . .to insert words
which the parties have not made use of0 It. . .
cannot interpret an agreement to mean something
the contract does not itself contain. . ."
Finally, in Paggi v. Skliris, 54 Utah 88, 179 P 739, 740 (1919) this
Court stated:
TT

. . .where the written agreement expresses the
intent of the parties in plain and unambiguous
language, it is the duty of the court to give
effect to that language. . ."
The term nnetTT has an acknowledged meaning.

"Net", according

to Websters New Collegiate Dictionary means:
"Clear of, or free from, all charges, deductions,
etc."
"Net", according to BlackTs Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p 0 1192,
defines net as:
"Clear of anything extraneous, with all deductions such as charges, expenses, discounts, commissions, taxes, etc., made." (citations omitted)
Net profits, in BlackTs Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1376, is
defined as:
"Net profits0 Theoretically all profits are
"net", o . .But as the expression "gross profits" is sometimes used to describe the mere
excess of present value over former cost, the
phrase, "net profits" is appropriate to describe the gain which remains after the further
deduction of all expenses, charges, costs,
allowance for depreciation, etc."
-15-

In 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts , §24-6 and 247, p. 637, states:
". 0 0explicit and positive language importing
a different purpose cannot be overruled, but
must be given its obvious meaning. 0 0 .Words
used in a contract will be given their ordinary
meaning. . ,TT
In AmJur 2d, supra, at Contracts, 251, p Q 643, declares:
"Although words in a contract are generally to
be given their usual and primary meaning0 B 0
words of art or words connected with a particular or peculiar trade are to be given the signification attached to them by experts in such
art or tradee . .TT
APB Accounting Principles, Vol. 2, Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 2,
page 9519, 9520: defines "net profits" as:
"Income and profit involve net or partially net
concepts and refer to amounts resulting from
the deduction from revenues, or from operating
revenues, of cost of goods sold, other expenses
and losses, or some of them. The terms are
often used interchangeably and are generally
preceded by an appropriate qualifying adjective
or term such as "gross", "operating", "net0 . 0
before income taxes", and "net". The terms are
also used in titles of statements showing results of operations, such as "income statement"
or "statement of profit and loss", or, sometimes "profit and loss account."
"The terms operating income or operating profit
are generally used to denote "gross profit" less
ordinary expenses. The terms net income or net
profit refer to the results in operations after
deducting from revenues all related costs and
expenses and all other charges and losses
assigned to the period0"
Again, in Management Accounting, Text and Cases, by Robert N. Anthony,
3rd Edition, 1964, reported 1971, at page 73, net profit is defined as:
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"Net income (or net profit, or net loss) 0 . .
Profit before income taxes less provision for
income taxes."
There is a Utah statute which sheds light on this subject.
Section 70A-1-205 (M-) , UCA, 1953, as amended, states:
"The express term of an agreement and applicable
course of dealing or usage of trade shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing
and usage of trade and course of dealing controls
usage of trade0"
It is apparent that the ordinary meaning, the technical mearving, and the usage in trade are all consistent with the meaning of "net
profits" to mean after taxes and not the artifical terms inserted by
the Trial Court of "net profits before taxes"0
its position by:

The Trial Court usurped

1 # going beyond the four corners of the contract; 2.

going beyond the ordinary meaning of the words;

30 going beyond the

meaning of the words attributed by experts in the field; and finally,
M-0 going beyond the actual construction used by the parties prior to
the litigation.
The accounting of Elmer Fox and Company, a copy of which
appears in the Exhibit file, discloses "net profits" after taxes. The
Squire, Inc., the vehicle created by Coombs to effectuate the joint
venture paid $27,4-12.00 in taxes during 1969 through 1973 (R. 28). The
Trial Court in its minute entry adopted Elmer Fox and CompanyTs interpretation on these previously paid taxes. At page 25 of the record the
minute entry reflects:
"The Court adopts the interpretation of Elmer
Fox and Company, as to the issue of taxes previously paid. . .Tf
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This is the last minute entry in time (February 14-, 1975) , and was made
after the Court received from Elmer Fox and Company a letter dated
January 28, 1975 wherein it stated:
"That portion of the SquireTs tax liability resulting from an allocation of taxes for periods in
which The SquireTs taxable income was offset
against Vista1s losses would be reflected in the
net equity of The Squire as acquired by Mr0 Smith
or as a payable due Mr. Smith in place of Vista."
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment do not reflect
this direct finding of the Trial Court.

If the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law had followed the Trial CourtTs minute entry the
following would be the result:
Total Assets of The Squire, Inc.

$

24-3,824-.00

Total Liabilities (as per Findings)

122,618.00

Plus act payable to Smith as per the
Trial CourtTs minute entry

27,4-12.00

TOTAL LIABILITIES

$

150,030.00

Net profit to be distributed

93,794.00

Coombs share (4-0% before taxes)

37,517.60

Less amount due to Squire from Coombs

25,726.00

Net amount due to Coombs without
allocation of taxes in the future
(R0 21, 22)

$

11,791.60

It is admitted that the contracts receivable (R. 29) of
$166,000000 have remaining terms of approximately ten years0

The un-

fairness of the position of Coombs, apparently adopted by the Trial
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Court, is easily demonstrated by the following example0

Assume that

the "net profitsTT before taxes (emphasis supplied) of the Squire, Inc.
is $100,000.00 and that the tax structure is 50%.
$ 100,000. total net profit before taxes
M-0,000. payable to Coombs (M-0%)
$

$

60,000.

left to pay taxes and 60% to Smith

50,000.

taxes payable (50%)

10,000o

balance left to Smith for his 60%o

The clear, concise, unambiguous language used by the parties,
must be given effect by the Court. The evidence discloses the parties
adopted a corporate form of entity to effectuate the joint venture
(R. M-ll) e

The construction urged by Coombs and adopted by the Trial

Court, is the result if the parties had used a partnership form of
business entity.

The historical payment of taxes, the use of the

words "net profits" together with the form of business entity all
point to the true meaning of "net profits".
POINT

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERJRED IN NOT MAKING
COOMBS ACCOUNT FOR TRADE-IN PROPERTY
The law is absolutely clear as to the fiduciary relationship
of parties to a joint venture. The statutory provisions, Section
M-8-1-18, UCA, 1953, as amended, states:
"Every partner must account to the partnership for
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits,
derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the
formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property."
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In Paggi v. Skliris, supra, at page 7M-0 of the Pacific Reporter, this
Court stated:
"That a member of a partnership will not be permitted to take advantage of any secret agreement
to receive a private or personal gain for the
work or business carried on by a partnership is
settled by the authorities."
Coombs received by way of trade-in a home and lot from the
Slaytons when the Slaytons purchased Lot 70. At pages 335 and 336 of
the record Coombs testified that Exhibits 13-P and 1M-P is a true and
accurate reflection of the Slayton transaction.

Then when asked about

the trade-in lot deeded to Coombs, Coombs stated:
TT

Mr. Brown. Q. Now, Mr. Coombs, you are under oath,
and I remind you of that because of this next question.
Isn't it a fact, that the sale price to the Slaytons
was not $4-200.; and isnTt it a fact, that you took in
by way of trade-in and Mr0 and Mrs. Slayton deeded to
you their equity in a home and lot of $1600 value?
A. I donTt remember the value of their home and lot.
That they deeded over to us the home and lot and it
was another trade-in transaction.
Q 0 That is not reflected on Exhibit 13-P or 14-P, is
it, Mr. Coombs?
A.

No. Not on those forms0

Q.

Have you ever accounted to The Squire for that lot?

A.

Yes. You have copies right there.

Q.

Talking about the lot that was traded in, Mr. Coombs?

A.

No. Wasnft necessary.

Q. WasnTt necessary?
A. No.
Q.

You just took $1600 worth of equity and it wasn*t
on_

necessary?
A.

ThatTs right."

(R. 335, 336)

Later, the following day after a recess, the convenient memory
of Coombs surfaced again. Under examination by Mr. Gordon, Coombs stated:
"Qo Now, I believe you also testified yesterday,
Mr. Coombs, regarding the sale of Lot 70 in the
subdivision, is that correct?
Ac

Yes0

I did.

Q. And p r i o r t o t h a t s a l e , did you discuss i t with
any representative of The Squire?
A.

With Mr. Smith."

(R. M-01)

The same day, Mrc Smith took the witness stand and testified:
"Mr. Brown: . . eMr. Smith,drawing your attention
to the testimony of Mr. Coombs today, he testified
that, as I recall, that he had a conversation with
you as it relates to Lot 70 in October of 1972 via
telephone as it relates to the trade-in home of
some $1,600., which Mr. Slayton deeded to Coombs.
Do you recall that in Mr. CoombsT testimony today?
A.

I recall his testimony.

Q. Mr. Smith, did that conversation in fact take
place?
A 0 It did not. I have never spoken to Mr. Coombs
about trade-in on Lot 70oTT (R. 510)
To further illustrate the convenience of Coombs1 memory and
his willingness to testify to anything to get out of a tight place,
Coombs1 explanation of the $1,600.00 value was:
"A. (by Coombs) Actually the money — the $1,600.00
and I don*t know where he gets that figure from, but
using his figure of $1,600.00 ~ $4-00.00 of it was
for the down payment on the lot which is represented
on this exhibit that he showed on the closing statement; $1,100.00 for lot improvement cost.
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Q.

Who improved t h e l o t ?

A.

I did0

Q.

Who p a i d for t h o s e improvements?

A.

I did."

(R. M-02)

First contrast this testimony to the previous day's.

Coombs

said he didnTt account at all and that he didnTt need to account. Now
one day later, after an overnight recess, he conveniently accounts by
a telephone conversation to Smith, which is emphatically denied by
Smith.

Next Coombs states the $M-00o00 is the down payment and $1,100.

is the lot improvements. The down payment however is in the $4-,200.
selling price reported to the Squire. The $l,600o trade-in lot is above
the down payment.

Immediately on cross-examination on this point,

before any recess, Coombs states:
TT

Qo (by Mr. Brown) All right. And today, sir,
you testified that on the Slayton lot, for example,
that you had put those improvements in and that
the trade-in equity in the home and lot for Mr.
Slayton was to pay for these lot improvements,
is that correct sir?
A.

Partly, yes.

QD The other part was the $M-00o00 down payment which
you reported, is that correct, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mr. Coombs, the Slayton Lot was Lot No0
70, wasnTt it?
A.

Yes.

It was.

Q. And in your answer to the interrogatory you had
rented that lot to a Mr. Duane Millett and Don
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Peterson for $59o00 per month for a total of 14months, is that correct?
A0

Yes.

Q 0 . 0 0DidnTt you charge the SlaytonTs in effect
$1,100.00 for the lot improvements?
A.

Yes0

I did0

Q 0 And in addition you received $826.00 from Mr.
Millet and Mr. Peterson?
A. Yes.
o

•

o

•

o

o

•

Qo o o oln fact thatTs what you have done on every
lot that you have rented, you have either charged
The Squire for the on-site improvements, or the
parties who purchased it, isnTt that true?
A 0 Well, I havenTt been paid yet by The Squire0
It*s true that I have charged them but they havenTt
paid it." (R. 403-407)
In the final accounting Smith gave credit for those on-site
improvements to Coombs (see Elmer Fox and Company1s accounting). However, the Trial Court, in derrogation of the law, did not have Coombs
account for the $1,600.00 trade-in home and lot.

(R0 20).

Coombs sold to himself Lot No. 25 for purposes of resale to
Doyle (Exhibit 6-P). Coombs stated at page 325 of the record:
"The sale was as an exchange of Doylefs properties
for Lot 25 which Vista and Utah Mobile Homes did
not want to get involved on the exchange of properties, therefore the arrangement to work it out
was that if I would take the responsibility of the
exchange properties, that they (The Squire, Inc.)
would carry me on the contract of the Doyle —
the Lot 25 balance.TT
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Exhibit 6-P reflects however that Coombs raised the price, from
$18,750o00 to $20,079.00, or a difference of $1,329.00. In addition
The Squire, Inc. obtained a discount of $501.88 from Utah Mobile Homes,
Inc. on the trailer on the lot which Coombs retained for a total amount
of $1,830.88.

Coombs testified that he reported the price of $18,750.00

to Mr. Prestwich at pages 399 and 400 of the record.

The Trial Court

again ruled Coombs need not account for this overreaching,,
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court erred in finding that a modification as it
relates to the cost over-runs since the modification required:
A0

Mutual consent, and no consent was ever given by
Vista or Smith0

Bo

No consideration was given Vista and/or Smith for
the alleged modification0

C. The evidence discloses that rather than consent
Vista, Prestwich and Smith all rejected any
modifications0
Do

Coombs admitted that Exhibit 2-P is correct in
all its terms.

The Trial Court erred in finding that the interest provisions
relating to the obligation of Coombs selling seven lots had been waived
and/or modified because:
A.

The evidence reflects only Coombs1 testimony
about a request to sell contracts and not a
modification or waiver0

Bo

Vista, Prestwich, and Smith rejected even any
offer to waive and/or modify.

C. The ^incontroverted evidence discloses that
the selling of seven lots was a critical
issue and was not forgiven or waived, see
Exhibit 5-P.
OII„

The Trial Court erred in substituting its own interpretation
in an attempt to re-write the contract.

The language of the contract

is clear and unambiguous. The intent must be obtained:
A.

From the language used by the parties0

B.

The ordinary meaning of the language used#

C. The technical meaning of the language used0
D.

The actions of the parties showing their
interpretations of the language so used.

E.

The Findings do not reflect the Trial CourtTs
own ruling (see minute entry, R. 25).

The Trial Court erred in failing to apply the law as it relates to the fiduciary relationship of the parties and requiring Coombs
to account for profits derived from the use of the joint venture properties.
It is respectfully submitted that this Court reverse the
lower Court and remand this action to the Trial Court with instructions
to modify the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and
granting judgment in favor of appellants and against respondent Coombs
in the following particulars:
A0

For $4-0,770.00 for cost over-runs.

B.

For $33,M-84-.l4-6 for interest expenses.

C. Declaring the clear unambiguous language of the
contract to mean "net profits" and not "net
profits before taxes".
D. An order directing Coombs to account to the
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joint venture for funds received on the
Slay ton Lot in the amount of $l,600o00
and the Doyle Lot in the amount of
$1,831.88.

Respectfully submitted,
JARDINE, BALDWIN, BROWN & SESSION
'

'
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James |t 0 Br"?
At^orriey for PlainViffs and
/Appellants
3±5 East Second South, Suite 900
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84-111
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